On August 26, at the 30th Annual Congress of the European Environmental Association (EEA) that was held at the University of Mannheim, the 2015 FEEM Awards were awarded to:
The FEEM award is a prize organized jointly with the European Economic Association aimed at rewarding the best research by young economists addressing key economic issues at the European and global scale. The selection process was conducted by the FEEM Award Commission, composed of Philippe Martin (Sciences Po), Volker Nocke (University of Mannheim and EEA Programme Chair) and Matteo Manera (FEEM and University of Milan).
Re3 is pleased to publish the videos where the three winners motivate their papers:
Interview with Keshav Dogra
“Optimal Debt Restructuring and Lending Policy in a Monetary Union”
"My paper is a theory paper motivated by the European debt crisis. What we saw in the crisis was that highly indebted countries were forced to deleverage in order to restore their access to the bonds markets. When they deleverage, they reduce demand throughout the whole Euro area [...].So what I want to ask in this paper is whether we can find some policies that restore debtors’ access to credit markets and make both borrower and debtor countries better off..."
Interview with Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Bonn)
“Is Ignorance Bliss? Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing”
"My motivation is that in recent years our access to information has changed. Due to new technologies like the internet, smartphones and so on, there is now a huge amount of information that is available out there. One could argue that nowadays it’s not the main challenge anymore to gather enough information, but the bottleneck is rather the limited capacity of a decision-maker to pay attention to all of this information. So this raises new questions and has led to new branches of literature….."
Interview with Jörg L. Spenkuch (Northwestern University)
“Backward Induction in the Wild: Evidence from the U.S. Senate”
"Much of economic theory is based on the idea that agents try to anticipate the actions of others in order to do better for themselves [...] if I get to act first, you get to act right after me and my own payoff depends on what you are going to do. Now, if I’m forward-looking, I will anticipate what you are going to do, I choose and then maximize my own payoffs. The problem with that sort of logic is that it typically fails when people have looked for it in laboratory experiments. In my paper I look for exactly the same type of logic in the US senate…"
2015 FEEM Award Ceremony