How can games be used to solve the climae stalemate? In this short interview Alessandro Tavoni, research fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the LSE and associate researcher at FEEM, gives practical examples on how experimental games can be integrated into more traditional lines of research on coalition formation and stability.
Concern over access to resources is high in EU political consciousness, given recent political instability and resource nationalism in resource-rich nations. The article offers an overview of the EU project POLINARES, aimed at identifying the challenges related to competition for access to resources, and at proposing approaches to collaborative solutions.
Given the stalemate of international climate change negotiations, a partial agreement, with only a subset of countries ratifying a treaty, is evaluated. The results indicate that a partial agreement with open membership is able to engage the major developing economies in mitigation actions and to relieve welfare losses of the signatory regions.
In this brief interview with FEEM, Bruno Latour explains why, in his opinion, international negotiations for environmental protection (e.g. Rio+20, UNFCC COPs, etc..) continue to fail. This has to do with an issue of proper representation of different interests, of scale, and because of the substantial separation between science and policy.
International treaties and cooperation processes require prospective member countries to achieve given standards in either economic, social or environmental quality. This article explores the effect of such standards on domestic political preferences to interpret shifts in political outcomes in the Euro-zone.
In the aftermath of Rio+20, failures and successes can be assessed: if the reform of UNEP, the battle against environmentally harmful subsidies and the acknowledgement of Green Growth as a pillar of Sustainable Development fall below expectations, the voluntary pledges made in Rio and the post-2015 process for Sustainable Development Goals leave a glimmer of hope.
Standard public good games are concerned with the creation of a collective gain. Climate change, however, is about avoiding an uncertain public bad. This has been framed as a “collective-risk social dilemma” of sequential contributions to a public climate fund aimed at avoiding a probabilistic loss arising if the target is missed.
On the way to Rio + 20, international climate expert Robert N. Stavins briefly reviews some key points from twenty years of history of international climate negotiations, from the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 to the Durban Climate Conference in 2011, to explain how the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” has opened an important window in climate talks.
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Water and Sewerage Industries
European Monetary Union
EU Energy Policy
Foreign Direct Investment